In recent years, a number of feminist scholars and activists have examined the function of rights in liberal political theory and have raised questions about the usefulness of liberal rights for women.
1 Some argue that although liberal rights can be used in arguments for women's equality, they can also function to uphold the power of privileged groups. For instance, in Pornography and Civil Rights, Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin point out that rather than winning equality for oppressed minorities, rights often function in ways that uphold the current structures of power in society: "Those who have power over others tend to call their power 'rights.' When those they dominate want equality, those in power say that important rights will be violated if society changes. . . . Law protects 'rights'-but mostly it protects the 'rights' of those who have power" (MacKinnon and Dworkin 1988, 17-18) . MacKinnon and Dworkin go on to describe the specific ways in which powerful groups have used rights to maintain their positions of dominance in society. For instance, they note that white supremacists in the segregated South used rights such as the "right to association" to argue against demands for integration: "Forced to integrate . . . whites lost the power to exclude Blacks. This they experienced as having lost the 'right' to associate with whom they wanted, that is to say, exclusively with each other" (1988, 17) . In other words, Hypatia vol. 14, no. 2 (Spring 1999 ) © by Lisa Schwartzman it is often the powerful groups in society who succeed in using rights to protect the advantages that they have.
What is to be made of the fact that liberal rights theory can function in support of hierarchies of power? Do cases in which this occurs merely involve improper applications of liberal rights theory, or is the liberal conception of rights flawed in a more fundamental way? If so, should feminists and other social justice activists avoid all reference to rights, or is there an alternative to the way that liberals define and use rights? Rather than undertaking a more general investigation and critique of liberal rights, my focus in this paper is somewhat narrower. I concentrate specifically on the works of Ronald Dworkin, Rae Langton, and Catharine MacKinnon to construct a particular feminist argument against liberal rights theory.
I begin by outlining one version of liberal rights theory-Ronald Dworkin's rights-based approach to the law. Although Dworkin is certainly not the only theorist to argue for the importance of liberal rights, he is a prominent legal theorist and philosopher who articulates clearly and concisely both the main tenets of liberalism and the fundamental importance of rights.
2 After highlighting the basic features of his liberal rights theory, I describe how Dworkin claims his theory would be applied in a particular case concerning pornography. In discussing the application of Dworkin's theory, I consider the possibility that liberal rights theory could be used to reach radical conclusions that contradict Dworkin's own liberal positions. One feminist philosopher, Rae Langton, raises just this possibility in an essay that focuses specifically on Dworkin and pornography. I examine Langton's argument to determine whether the problem with liberal rights theory stems from misapplication or from more fundamental problems in liberal theory. Ultimately, I argue that although it can be used to support radical conclusions, liberalism has certain features that tend to lead it to support the status quo instead.
In explaining the fundamental problems with liberal theory and its conception of rights, I draw on the work of Catharine MacKinnon, a feminist attorney, activist, and scholar. I find that MacKinnon offers one of the most interesting and compelling critiques of liberal political and legal theory; she articulates the problems with liberalism without entirely dismissing liberal concepts, and she situates her discussion in a critical analysis of social and political structures of power. Without rejecting liberalism outright, MacKinnon highlights its problems and offers suggestions about how the relationship between theory and politics could be conceptualized differently.
In piecing together criticisms culled from MacKinnon's writings, I argue that liberal rights-based approaches to the law are problematic for the following three reasons: first, liberal approaches typically define "rights" as rights against majoritarian decisions in a democratic society; second, they claim that rights are possessed by people as individuals; third, they see a fundamental distinction between rights and goals. After identifying these problems within liber-alism, I argue that this is not the only way that rights could be defined. Rather, by calling into question certain assumptions and procedures of liberal methodology, MacKinnon suggests that there could be a different-and more radical-way of conceiving of rights. I conclude by suggesting that rights are not inherently problematic; what is problematic is the specific way that they are formulated and used within liberal theory.
DWORKIN'S LIBERALISM AND THE IMPORTANCE OF RIGHTS
To explain the basic way that liberal approaches to the law define and implement rights, I begin by briefly explicating some important aspects of Ronald Dworkin's theory of liberalism. According to Dworkin, the "fundamental distinction within political theory" (1977, 82) is between arguments of principle-which are "arguments intended to establish an individual right"-and arguments of policy-"arguments intended to establish a collective goal" (1977, 90) . Although Dworkin acknowledges that any complex political program is likely to make use of both rights and goals, he argues that if someone has a right to something, this can override the community's goal. Dworkin explains, "Rights are best understood as trumps over some background justification for political decisions that states a goal of the community as a whole " (1984b, 153) . In other words, if an individual has a right to something, this right is maintained even if it conflicts with the goals of the community or government. Thus, a government may not act simply according to whatever will produce overall benefits for the community; it must respect the rights of individuals as fundamental, and it must allow these rights to act as restricting conditions on the majoritarian goals of society.
The most basic right of individuals, according to Dworkin, is the right to be treated with "equal concern and respect" (1984a, 62) . Because individuals are said to differ in their conception of the good life, treating each with "equal concern and respect" requires that the government remain "neutral" on these questions. 3 The best mechanisms for ensuring equal treatment, argues Dworkin, are the two main institutions of our own society-democracy and the economic market (1984a, 66) . In themselves, however, these institutions are not sufficient to guarantee the rights of individuals to be treated equally. For instance, Dworkin notes that in a democracy the government could legislate, according to the majority's preferences, to ban certain sexual practices or the expression of certain forms of unpopular political opinions. While this would be permitted according to democratic norms (because it is simply enacting the majority's preferences), it would nonetheless "invade" rather than enforce "the right of citizens to be treated as equals " (1984a, 69-70) . Dworkin explains that such policies appeal to people's "external preferences"-preferences that are not strictly "personal" but that are actually preferences "about what others shall do or have " (1984a, 70) . To prevent this sort of problem (which is likely to arise in a democracy), a society must somehow "determine those political decisions that are antecedently likely to reflect strong external preferences" and "remove those decisions from majoritarian political institutions altogether " (1984a, 70) . Thus, with this system of rights (specifically, the Bill of Rights) in place, the institutions of our society-democracy and the economic market-will be best able to protect the rights of individuals to act on their own preferences about "the good life" and to ensure that the government treats individuals with "equal concern and respect." Given Dworkin's argument for the importance of rights, several questions arise: What exactly are the rights of individuals that must be recognized to ensure that they be entitled to pursue their conceptions of "the good" according to their "personal" preferences? Specifically what must a government do to ensure that it is treating its citizens with equal concern and respect and that it is not inadvertently endorsing people's "external" preferences? How can a government guarantee that it remain "neutral" on questions of "the good life"? Dworkin admits that his theory of liberalism is abstract; in fact, he suggests that it must be so if it is to remain "neutral" and not favor any particular preferences. He explains that his theory of rights "does not, of course, tell us exactly what rights men do have against the Government" (1977, 192) . This is a question about which "reasonable men disagree" (1977, 197) . Nor does his theory of rights detail exactly how the lines are to be drawn between "personal" and "external" preferences. 4 Dworkin explains that the answer to this question "will depend on general facts about the prejudices and other external preferences of the majority at any given time, and different liberals will disagree about what is needed at any particular time" (1984a, 70). Dworkin does not consider this to be a problem, however; he trusts that the majority will answer these questions in ways that will recognize the minority's right to equality. He explains, "The institution of rights is therefore crucial, because it represents the majority's promise to the minorities that their dignity and equality will be respected. . . . The institution requires an act of faith on the part of the minorities, because the scope of their rights will be controversial whenever they are important, and because the officers of the majority will act on their own notions of what these rights really are" (Dworkin 1977, 205) . In other words, Dworkin acknowledges that although there is a "promise" of equal concern and respect, minorities will have to rely on the good faith efforts of those in power to recognize their rights as individuals.
It seems, then, that one initial problem for Dworkin's theory may be the indeterminacy with which specific rights are delineated and justified according to his system. How could there ever be any assurance that the rights of all individuals would be protected equally? In theory, the rights that are encoded in the Bill of Rights are supposed to guarantee that this happens, but what is to stop the governmental and judicial officials from interpreting these unfairly, from importing their own "external" preferences into the law (with or without realizing that they are doing so)? In other words, what is to guarantee that the mechanism that is supposed to guarantee neutrality is not misused and applied in a non-neutral way, according to preferences of the majority or of the officials in power? Clearly, these are only some of the questions that arise when considering the application of Dworkin's rights-based strategy.
APPLYING DWORKIN'S LIBERAL RIGHTS APPROACH
In Taking Rights Seriously (1977) and in A Matter of Principle (1985) , Dworkin discusses some particular conclusions that he reaches through applying his rights-based arguments to political and legal issues. In A Matter of Principle, for instance, he argues that a rights-based approach to pornography yields the conclusion that restrictions on pornography are unjustified.
5 He explains that even though "[t]he majority of people in both countries [Britain and the U.S.] would prefer (or so it seems) substantial censorship" (Dworkin 1985, 335) , this would violate the right to "moral independence" (which is rooted in the right to equal treatment) of individuals. Thus, because individual rights trump the majoritarian goals of the community, Dworkin's rights-based strategy prohibits banning or restricting pornography.
Feminists can argue against Dworkin's defense of this "right to pornography" in a couple of different ways. Although I focus on MacKinnon's response to this sort of argument, Rae Langton suggests another response. Langton argues that one could disagree with Dworkin's conclusion about the question of pornography, yet maintain that the problem with Dworkin's argument lies not in the theory of liberalism that he uses but instead in the particular way that he applies that theory in the case of pornography. In her essay, "Whose Right? Ronald Dworkin, Women, and Pornographers," Langton brilliantly illustrates that the conclusion that Dworkin reaches about pornography is not the only one that follows from his own approach (Langton 1990 ). In fact, she claims that by making use of some empirical claims about pornography that Dworkin does not consider, and by employing the definition of external preferences that he employs in his analysis of the Sweatt case (as opposed to the more general definition he gives elsewhere), one can arrive at the opposite conclusion. 6 In other words, Langton shows how the very same rights-based strategy Dworkin uses, when employed in the context of different background knowledge and with an expanded (but nonetheless "Dworkinian") definition of "external preferences," can lead to a rights-based argument in favor of restrictions on pornography. In demonstrating this, Langton argues that it is not necessary to provide conclusive evidence that pornography causes violence, but rather simply that it is in conflict with women's right to "equal concern and respect." Langton makes her argument in a parallel fashion to the way that Dworkin argues; she sets up a utilitarian argument and then shows how it can be "trumped" by the rights claims of individuals whose right to equality it would otherwise threaten. Although the argument that Langton sets up has the same basic structure as Dworkin's, she begins with the utilitarian argument in favor of permitting pornography (the argument that "most people would prefer that pornography be permitted, and so our policy should be to permit pornography" [Langton 1990, 338] ), and the rights to which she refers are the rights of women to be treated with equal concern and respect. According to Langton, Dworkin goes wrong in his application of his own method in part because he starts with the wrong utilitarian argument and in part because he does not take into account the empirical evidence concerning how pornography affects women's right to equality.
Thus, on one reading of Langton's argument, Dworkin's major error is that he does not sufficiently evaluate the context in which he is deploying the rights of individuals to "equal treatment." Had he paid more attention to the fact of women's inequality and understood individuals' "preferences for pornography" in this context, he would have come to very different conclusions.
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In fact, at the end of her essay, Langton suggests that it would be possible to apply this same Dworkinian strategy that she employs here to questions that arise concerning other civil liberties that liberals typically defend; for instance, because racist hate speech violates the right that members of certain racial minorities have to "equal concern and respect," an argument for limiting or banning it could be supported by this approach. In other words, it seems that one can begin with a liberal rights approach and arrive at non-liberal, "radical" conclusions. Because the liberal rights approach does not specify details like whose rights are to be made central to the argument and which utilitarian argument is most plausible (nor does it suggest what is necessary for individuals to be treated with "equal concern and respect" in particular contexts), it can lead to different conclusions depending on the context in which it is employed.
Perhaps the "context" in which debates about pornography occur has changed in recent years enough that Dworkin would have to take feminist concerns into account when discussing pornography (which he does not even attempt to do in his earlier piece). Unfortunately, despite increased public awareness of the systematic sexual abuse of women, and despite his having had ample opportunity to consider pornography in the context of questions about women's oppression, Dworkin's analysis has not evolved. In a 1993 review of MacKinnon's Only Words, Dworkin criticizes MacKinnon's advocacy of a law that would empower women who claim that they were abused sexually as a result of the making or use of pornography to bring civil suits against pornographers. Although presumably aware of the evidence of the widespread sexual abuse of women (Dworkin does not deny that many women are abused and suffer from sexual harassment, rape, etc.), Dworkin still has not altered his views on pornography. He continues to view the problem of pornography as if it were the mere "expression of the idea feminists most loathe" (Dworkin 1993, 36 ; italics added); moreover, he specifically rejects several of MacKinnon's main arguments. For instance, Dworkin rejects MacKinnon's argument for the claim that pornography silences women; he maintains that while the First Amendment can protect freedom of speech, it cannot offer any positive guarantees about the conditions under which one utilizes this right. In rejecting MacKinnon's argument, Dworkin asserts that her claim that it is women -not pornographers-who are in need of freedom of speech is "premised on an unacceptable proposition: that the right to free speech includes a right to circumstances that encourage one to speak, and a right that others grasp and respect what one means to say. These are obviously not rights that any society can recognize or enforce" (Dworkin 1993, 38) . Furthermore, Dworkin defends the right of pornographers to publish pornography by suggesting that what the pornographers are doing is expressing their "hostile or uncongenial tastes" and by claiming that they should be free to express or indulge these tastes. Referring specifically to the tastes and views of sexists and racists, he explains, "In a genuinely egalitarian society, however, those views cannot be locked out, in advance, by criminal or civil law: they must instead be discredited by the disgust, outrage, and ridicule of other people" (1993, 41) . In other words, Dworkin claims that the state must be neutral between the different "tastes" and "preferences" that its citizens express, and that it must therefore recognize people's right to pursue these preferences.
Thus, in contradiction to Langton's suggestion, it seems that the reasons Dworkin has for rejecting restrictions on pornography might not be limited to the fact that he does not consider the evidence of women's subordination. Rather, certain characteristics of liberal thought seem to lend themselves to rejecting the sorts of arguments that more radical theorists-like MacKinnon-are making. In the remaining part of this paper, I use MacKinnon's work to analyze critically some of the basic tenets of Dworkin's theory and to show why liberal, rights-based approaches such as his tend to lead to conclusions that support the status quo.
MACKINNON'S CRITIQUE OF LIBERAL RIGHTS-BASED APPROACHES I. RIGHTS AS "RIGHTS AGAINST THE MAJORITY"
MacKinnon's critique of liberalism calls into question Dworkin's claim that it is primarily the government (which expresses the majority's will in a democracy) against which people can be said to have rights. Her work illuminates the ways in which other structures of social power operate to oppress and exploit people. The structure of male dominance, for instance, while often working in conjunction with state power, is not entirely dependent on or derivative from it. MacKinnon explains, "[M]en's forms of dominance over women have been accomplished socially as well as economically, prior to the op-eration of law, without express state acts, often in intimate contexts, as everyday life" (1989, 161) . Because the government is not the sole source of power in a society, it is not the only power that is capable of depriving people of their rights. (To assume that it is only the government who can deprive one of power, suggests MacKinnon, is to assume the position of one who is already socially privileged in every other way.) Given that a non-governmental hierarchy such as gender involves relations of power, it seems that individuals should also be entitled to rights against systematic sexist harms, whether or not the government explicitly instigates these harms.
While MacKinnon focuses primarily on the ways that liberal conceptions of rights and equality do not adequately address issues of gender injustice, similar arguments can and have been made about race and class, and about various combinations of gender, race, and class oppression. Because liberal theory tends to focus on the ways that the government can infringe on people's rights through its explicit policies and procedures, liberal legal theory often leaves relations of class, race, and gender hierarchy unaddressed, especially when these three hierarchies are intertwined in complex ways. A number of feminists of color have argued that when the oppression that women undergo is not only based on gender but also on race and/or class, the law has an even harder time acknowledging and addressing the problem. For instance, because the law typically recognizes discrimination based on deviance from a standard, the claims of white women have been taken as definitive of discrimination based on sex, and the claims of men of color have been taken as definitive of discrimination based on race.
8 According to liberal legal theory, these are the prime candidates to represent "sexual" and "racial" discrimination because the lives of white women and Black men are each seen as different from the white male standard in only one way. The problem with this is that under conditions of racial and gender hierarchy, these phenomena are intertwined and their effects are compounded. For instance, racist hate crimes committed against women of color are often also sexual crimes, and yet they tend to be prosecuted as either one or the other and not both-if they are prosecuted at all, that is (Zia 1994, 234-35) .
9 A similar problem can be seen by examining the ways that people of color are depicted in pornography. If pornography is understood as reinforcing relations of power at all, it is typically thought to reinforce gender hierarchy. Nonetheless, studies have shown that a great deal of pornography that uses women and men of color depicts them in ways that reinforce racial and ethnic stereotypes.
10 Thus, for women of color, pornography can simultaneously be a vehicle of both racial and gender oppression. Unfortunately, the rights that people are granted formally under liberalism do not provide much in the way of protection from this sort of oppression.
In response to this, a liberal might argue that because there are laws-both criminal and civil-preventing harms perpetrated by either the government or by individuals, protection already exists against the systemic harms of rac-ism, sexism, classism, etc. Whether an individual, group, or government commits these sorts of harms, laws already exist to address them. Focusing on civil law, and on constitutional law in particular, MacKinnon does not deny that the law provides a formal guarantee to respect and protect the rights of individuals to be treated "equally." Nonetheless, the way that liberal theorists interpret and employ these rights often renders them ineffective in bringing justice to people whose oppression is constituted through the operation of racial, sexual, and economic power structures. Without addressing and altering these power structures, MacKinnon argues, the formal granting of the rights to free speech, privacy, freedom, and equality are not going to succeed in bringing about justice and equality for women, or for other members of oppressed groups.
11 Although recent laws that recognize sexual harassment as a problem of sex equality are one exception to this, for the most part the law does not acknowledge explicitly the oppression of women and attempt to remedy it. Rather, the rights of women and members of other oppressed groups are recognized to the extent that the persons in these positions resemble white, uppermiddle-class men.
Note that MacKinnon is not suggesting that these structures of power are wholly independent of the state or that they will not change unless structures outside the realm of the state change first. MacKinnon sees the power of the state working in conjunction with these specific hierarchies-in both overt and covert ways. Thus, rather than interpreting these liberal rights and freedoms as simply rights against government intervention, MacKinnon argues that they must be understood in the context of inequality and oppression; they must be interpreted in such a way that they can begin to change these structures of oppression and thereby make it possible for people to exercise the formal rights that the Constitution legally grants them.
On a similar note, MacKinnon also criticizes the liberal claim that individuals have rights against the government because it endorses a "negative" (as opposed to "positive") view of the state. According to this liberal view, as long as the state is not taking specific action to deprive individuals of their rights, then it is said that no one's rights are violated. Not only does this suggest that there are no other, non-governmental, structures of power (against which individuals should also be entitled to rights), but it also suggests that the state need not do anything actively to ensure that people have rights. By declaring that individuals have rights against the government, liberals suggest that everyone already enjoys a basic equality before the government and before the law. One specific manifestation that this takes involves the right to free speech: "The most basic assumption underlying First Amendment adjudication is that, socially, speech is free. The First Amendment says, 'Congress shall not abridge the freedom of speech.' Free speech exists. The problem for government is to avoid constraining that which, if unconstrained by government, is free. This tends to presuppose that whole segments of the population are not systematically silenced socially, prior to government action" (MacKinnon 1987, 157-58) . In other words, by interpreting the First Amendment in this way, the liberal approach to the law presupposes that everyone already has basically equal access to speech. Challenging this assumption, MacKinnon argues that given the pervasiveness of gender inequality-as well as the additional hierarchies of race and class (which further disadvantage many women as well as some men)-it is not the case that all individuals really have "freedom of speech." For groups who are excluded from access to the power that would otherwise enable them to enjoy this right, freedom of speech is not really about "the avoidance of state intervention as such," but it is instead a matter of "finding an affirmative means to get access to speech for those to whom it has been denied" (1987, 158) . 12 However, according to the liberal "constitutional invocation of the superiority of 'negative freedom'-staying out, letting be-over positive legal affirmations" (1989, 164) , this is precisely what socially subordinated groups are not allowed. Without the social conditions and institutional power arrangements that are needed to exercise rights, people who are oppressed socially will not be able to utilize their rights in the same way that those who have power over them will be able to do.
Furthermore, MacKinnon argues that the harm from which oppressed groups suffer, because of the way in which rights are conceived as "negative" rights against the state, is not limited to the fact that they are frequently unable to exercise their rights in any meaningful way. In an unequal society, the power that one group enjoys is often power over another group; as a result, the latter group may suffer whenever the first group exercises its rights. Thus, the assertion of negative rights by members of the powerful group may further solidify the inequality: "If one group is socially granted the positive freedom to do whatever it wants to another group, to determine that the second group will be and do this rather than that, no amount of negative freedom legally guaranteed to the second group will make it the equal of the first. For women, this has meant that civil society, the domain in which women are distinctively subordinated and deprived of power, has been placed beyond reach of legal guarantees" (MacKinnon 1989, 164-65) . By granting negative rights to the dominant group-men, in this case-and depriving the subordinated group of access to any rights that would bring about change, the law can function to cement inequality. As an example of the way this works, MacKinnon discusses the law of privacy. She explains that because this law, formulated as a negative right, "restricts intrusions into intimacy," it also "bars change in control over that intimacy " (1987, 101) . In this way, the right to privacy works to uphold the "existing distribution of power and resources within the private sphere . . . the legal concept of privacy can and has shielded the place of battery, marital rape, and women's exploited labor. . . ." (1987, 101) . Thus the laws and rights of a "negative" state not only prevent women-and other oppressed groups-from achieving the "positive" freedom necessary to exercise their rights, but they may also reinforce the rights of the powerful to continue to exploit and oppress.
In response to these criticisms-that liberal rights are conceived primarily as negative rights against the government and not against other institutional power relations-liberals might contend that MacKinnon unfairly lumps together the positions of modern political liberals with the positions of classical liberals. While Dworkin is a "liberal" in terms of the contemporary liberal/ conservative split, he is at least less explicitly wedded to the "negative freedom" conception of liberty and rights than are classical liberals such as Robert Nozick. Nonetheless, it seems that MacKinnon would claim that contemporary liberal political philosophers-including Dworkin-still place far too much emphasis on negative rights and freedoms, and far too little emphasis on the social conditions necessary to make use of these. For instance, as I noted earlier, Dworkin argues that the right to free speech does not include the "right to circumstances that encourage one to speak" or "a right that others grasp and respect what one means to say" (1993, 38) . Dworkin seems to think that MacKinnon suggests that law can force people to listen to, to respect, or to understand one another, and he ridicules her for holding this position. This misrepresents MacKinnon; she never claims that people should be legally forced to respond in this way. Nevertheless, both MacKinnon and Dworkin clearly hold that people have a right to "equal treatment." Dworkin explicitly states that everyone has not only a right to "equal treatment"-that is, the right to an equal distribution of some opportunity, resource, or burden-but also a right to "treatment as an equal." It is this latter right that Dworkin considers "fundamental," it is supposed to guarantee that each individual "be treated with the same respect and concern as anyone else" (Dworkin 1977, 227) . Unfortunately, when Dworkin articulates specifically what the government must do to ensure that everyone has the right to "equal concern and respect," he too often assumes that the state need not-and cannot-do much of anything to bring these conditions about for those who suffer from gender, race, and class hierarchies. To the extent that Dworkin takes these conditions for granted-and as beyond the realm of government responsibility-his position bears an unfortunate similarity to classical libertarian liberalism. By assuming that a strategy of official "neutrality" will best respect the rights of individuals to free speech and privacy, for instance, Dworkin fails to acknowledge the ways that the state is (and historically has been) complicit in various forms of oppression, and he fails to note the crucial role that positive rights and freedoms need to play in securing these opportunities for all.
II. RIGHTS AS "INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS"
In addition to her critique of the "negative" construction of liberal rights, MacKinnon is also critical of the way that liberals tend to conceive of rights as properly belonging only to individuals. In Dworkin's explanation of what rights are, he is clear about the fact that people are entitled to their rights not because of their membership in this or that group, but because of their status as "individuals" (Dworkin 1984a, 71) . What MacKinnon points out is that there is a problem with conceiving of rights in this way; because liberal theory grants rights to individuals as individuals, it primarily recognizes only violations of rights that occur one at a time, to individuals as individuals. For instance, MacKinnon explains that liberal theory has a hard time identifying the sexist harm of pornography because its conception of injury is "individuated, atomistic, linear, exclusive, isolated, narrowly tortlike-in a word, positivistic" and that "discrimination does not work like this" (1989, 208) . She goes on to explain that pornography "does hurt individuals, just not as individuals in a one-at-a-time sense, but as members of the group women" (1989, 208) .
14 Thus, MacKinnon argues, liberalism's conception of harm focuses on the individual as an isolated person and thereby fails to see the way that individual, personal events can manifest and replicate societal structures of inequality.
In contrast, according to a group-based conception of harm, the harms women suffer are not reducible to the sum of the harms each individual woman suffers; to understand the harm of particular incidents of sexist oppression, something must be known about the conditions of women's lives under male dominance. Until such conditions have been identified and analyzed, one cannot understand the full meaning of the harm that individual women suffer from domestic violence, sexual harassment, pornography, rape, etc. In other words, the context of male dominance-and the conditions of women's lives under male dominance-is part of what constitutes the meaning of particular incidents of sexist harm. Without analyzing this context from the perspective of women who are affected by sexism, legal and political theorists tend to assume that all individuals enjoy the same basic circumstances-roughly those of white, upper-middle-class men. Of course, once it has been pointed out (by, for instance, feminists, anti-racist activists, or workers struggling for justice) that the conditions facing certain individuals are different from those facing members of the dominant class, liberal theorists are eventually able to incorporate these criticisms into their theory. In other words, while liberalism can accommodate more radical critiques after these alternative descriptions of society have been put forth and accepted, liberalism is not-in and of itselfsufficient for generating such critiques. It tends to place too much emphasis on the individual and on the personal circumstances of the individual; thus, liberals such as Dworkin initially tend to overlook the significance of the social circumstances in which individuals are constituted.
In describing the problem with liberalism's view of harm, MacKinnon notes that injuries that are group-based-and not solely "individual"-tend to coincide with larger structures of social, political, and economic power. Because of the way in which racism and sexism are embedded in society, the harm of a racist or sexist practice often cannot be isolated easily from the social organization of society and as a result may not even be recognizable as harm. MacKinnon explains how this liberal conception of harm (based on a model of "individuals" whose rights can be violated) may make the harm of pornography impossible to detect: "If pornography is systemic, it may not be isolable from the system in which it exists. This does not mean that no harm exists. It does mean that because the harm is so pervasive, it cannot be sufficiently isolated to be perceived as existing according to this model of causality . . . " (MacKinnon 1989, 207) . Ronald Dworkin's discussion of pornography exemplifies this problem with the liberal conception of harm. In particular, when he attempts to defend his position against the feminist claim that pornography causes harm to women's "equality," he takes issue with the notion that pornography could be "an important cause or vehicle" (Dworkin 1991, 106) of the construction of women's identity. He responds to this possibility by simply claiming, "That seems strikingly implausible" (1991, 106). The evidence (or argument) he offers for this implausibility is the following comparison: "It seems unlikely that it [pornography] has remotely the influence over how women's sexuality or character or talents are conceived by men, and indeed by women, that commercial advertising and soap operas have" (1991, 106) . 15 According to MacKinnon, however, the fact that other pervasive social practices and institutions reinforce the harm of pornography does not mean that pornography "causes" no harm. Rather, it is a part of the sexist structures of society that harm women's right to equality; the fact that its harm cannot be isolated should not lead one to conclude that it causes no harm, but rather to conclude that the harm that it causes is pervasive and systemic.
Of course, one could raise the question of why it is that MacKinnon objects so strongly to pornography if it is not the only practice that is harmful to women. If it is true that soap operas and commercial advertising are also harmful to women's equality, why does MacKinnon not call for restricting them, as she does with pornography? First, it seems unlikely that MacKinnon would agree with Dworkin's simple assertion that pornography has comparatively little influence on women's equality. Although commercial advertising and soap operas may promote sexist ideas concerning what roles, activities, and mental, emotional, and physical qualities are "normal" and attractive for women, these ads and programs do not deal with sexual practices as explicitly as pornography does. Given the significant role that the structures and practices of sexuality play in women's subordination, MacKinnon would argue that an industry that explicitly perpetuates and constructs sexual norms is influential in a way that other industries and institutions are not.
Furthermore, the harm that MacKinnon discusses is not limited to the ways in which pornography affects "how women's sexuality or character or talents are conceived." Rather than merely arguing against this sort of abstraction, MacKinnon is also arguing against the actual physical and sexual abuse that arise out of the production and use of pornography. For MacKinnon and other feminist anti-pornography activists, the industry of pornography harms women's equality not only because it affects the social perception of what is "sexual" but also because it has actual consequences for the lives of many women who are used in its making and who are abused as a consequence of its consumption. MacKinnon details numerous examples of how women have been targeted for rape and other sexual abuse and torture as a result of the consumption of pornography, 16 and she notes that " [l] aboratory experiments showed that pornography that portrays sexual aggression as pleasurable for the victim-as so much pornography does-increases the acceptance of the use of coercion in sexual relations" (MacKinnon 1991, 799) . Thus, pornography helps to create a context in which sexual abuse is more likely to occur, even if it does not directly lead men to go out and commit rape. MacKinnon also objects to the violent and coercive conditions that exist within the industry. In the following passage, she argues that pornography is not just an "idea" because actual women must be used to produce it:
[I]t should be observed that it is the pornography industry, not the ideas in the materials, that forces, threatens, blackmails, pressures, tricks, and cajoles women into sex for pictures. In pornography, women are gang raped so they can be filmed. They are not gang raped by the idea of a gang rape. It is for pornography, and not by the ideas in it, that women are hurt and penetrated, tied and gagged, undressed and genitally spread and sprayed with lacquer and water so pictures can be made. . . . It is unnecessary to do any of these things to express, as ideas, the ideas pornography expresses. (MacKinnon 1993a, 15) Thus, it seems that MacKinnon is suggesting that women are hurt more seriously-or at least more directly-in the production and use of pornography than they are as a result of commercial advertisements and soap operas. Although liberals might claim that no one should be involved in pornography unless she is a willing participant who has made a rational career decision, MacKinnon would surely object to this individualistic view. Much of her work focuses on the ways that the social, political, and economic conditions of women's lives under male dominance lead women to be coerced into accepting jobs in the sex industry (as well as other jobs where they are subjected to severe sexual harassment), even though this is not necessarily what these women would choose to do under conditions of freedom and equality. The coercion that leads women to take these sorts of jobs may be more or less explicit, but it is seen most clearly when one takes a "group-based" approach to harm. In other words, if one assumes that individuals are only harmed as individuals, it is much more difficult to understand the ways in which the conditions of a woman's life as a woman affect the decisions and choices that she makes.
III. CRITIQUE OF "RIGHTS" VERSUS "GOALS"
Not only is MacKinnon critical of the way in which Dworkin's liberal theory suggests that rights are held against the majority and as an individual, but she is also implicitly critical of the separation that Dworkin sees between rights and goals. In describing Dworkin's theory of liberalism, I noted that Dworkin divides political arguments into two fundamentally different kinds-those intended to establish a collective goal, defined as a goal of the "community as a whole," and those intended to establish an individual right. While Dworkin would surely acknowledge that a society can change in such a way that it comes to recognize the rights of certain groups that were formerly not acknowledged, for the most part, the way that Dworkin seeks to distinguish "rights" from "goals" suggests that rights are that which people already have and not goals that a society must attempt to achieve by creating institutions and practices that embody them. Thus, when Dworkin discusses the right to "equal concern and respect," he cannot suggest that it is a goal that all should have this right-or even that the state needs to go about creating a situation in which each individual can actually enjoy this right-but rather he must be describing a right that all individuals already possess.
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In other words, one of the main problems with Dworkin's way of separating rights from goals is that "equality" ends up becoming a right-specifically, the "right to equal treatment"-rather than also being considered a goal. In attempting to protect and maintain equality, the liberal state is supposed to adopt procedures that treat the expressed preferences of individuals with "official neutrality." In contrast to such procedures-which she suggests actually maintain the status quo-MacKinnon thinks that significant changes in the social relations of power must be brought about if people's right to equality is going to be achieved. If the state is going to promote this right for all of its citizens, it must concern itself specifically with the goal of rectifying current (and pervasive) inequalities. MacKinnon warns that problems arise when the state promotes the other rights of its citizens without concerning itself with promoting equality. She and Andrea Dworkin explain, "We need to establish a legal imperative toward equality. Without equality as a fundamental value, 'rights' is a euphemism for 'power,' and legally protected dominance will continue to preclude any real equality" (MacKinnon and Dworkin 1988, 22) . In other words, the state must actively attempt to achieve equality and not presuppose that it already exists. Achieving equality must be of constant concern as the state works to define and enforce the other rights of its citizens.
18 Thus, the goal of equality is not only significant in and of itself, but it is also relevant to the way in which other rights are socially defined, granted, and enforced. One example of the way in which MacKinnon sees the goal of equality as central to the definition of other rights is her discussion of the right to free speech and its relation to pornography. On the one hand, because liberals like Dworkin assume that "equality" involves procedures of neutral treatment amongst expressed preferences, they do not necessarily view the facts of women's current inequality (as evidenced by widespread sexual abuse and exploitation) as relevant to questions of free speech. MacKinnon, on the other hand, suggests that equality is a goal that society must aim to achieve; it is not merely a matter of treating people's preferences "neutrally." Thus, given that the state has a responsibility to create and pursue equality (so that everyone will have the opportunity to be treated with "equal concern and respect"), it must actively attempt to see that the rights that people are granted do not further entrench already-existing inequalities. To pursue equality, the law must view many different issues and rights in an "equality" context; discussions of the general rights to free speech and privacy, as well as discussions of more specific issues like abortion, sexual harassment, and pornography, must all take place in the context of questions about equality and what is needed to achieve it.
19
Unless rights are seen in an equality context, it is too frequently assumed that all individuals have equal access to these rights when they do not. What MacKinnon is arguing, then, is that for people to be granted their rights in any meaningful way, these rights must include some entitlement to the positive freedoms and basic equality necessary to make use of them.
In short, it seems that MacKinnon's critique of liberal rights is best understood not as a simple critique of rights in themselves, but rather as a critique of the way in which liberal theory conceptualizes and employs these rights without regard to questions of equality. It is this dismissal of concern for equality (or this misunderstanding of "equality" to mean mere "neutrality" among expressed preferences) that is largely responsible for the liberal assumption that rights are separate from goals, that individuals already possess them and they need only be preserved and protected. Rather than understanding rights in this way, MacKinnon holds a view of rights that is much more in line with the way that activists of the Civil Rights Movement conceptualized "civil rights." According to this view, rights are not abstract and general, but are tied closely to political struggle and to the undoing of social inequality. In a discussion of civil rights, MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin note:
Ever since Black people demanded legal change as one means to social change, civil rights has stood for the principle that systematic social inequality-the legal and social institutionalization of group-based power and powerlessness-should and would be undone by law. (MacKinnon and Dworkin 1988, 29) In other words, the notion of "civil rights" that came out of the Civil Rights Movement embodies a view of change; rights are that which need to be achieved through altering the social structures of inequality. In Pornography and Civil Rights, MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin argue that because pornography is "a practice of civil inequality on the basis of gender," it is a violation of women's "civil rights" (1988, 31) . However, the right to be free from pornography (and from a pornographic world) is clearly not one that women currently enjoy. Nor is this right considered to be inherent in the abstract conception of rights to which all individuals are said to be entitled in our liberal society. In contrast, the right to be free from pornography has arisen out of political struggle; it has been articulated and put forth as the result of a specific analysis of the social structures of power, and it is linked inextricably to a desire to change those structures-a desire to achieve equality. In this way, the meaning of "rights" is expanded to include the interests and perspectives of those groups who were formally denied them. 20 In other words, for rights to be meaningful-for them not to be empty abstractions that often support the status quo-they must be linked both to an analysis of the social structure and to some sort of "goal" with regards to changing it.
SITUATING RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF INEQUALITY
In the previous section, I described several problems that MacKinnon identifies in liberal theory: she criticizes liberals for conceiving of rights as individual rights against the government (and not instead as rights that members of oppressed groups hold against whomever oppresses them), and she argues against the liberal separation of rights from goals. Given these problems that MacKinnon has identified, Langton's suggestion that it is easy to make Dworkin's liberal theory yield non-liberal conclusions seems incorrect; liberalism is plagued with problems more serious than the mere fact that it does not take certain empirical information into account and that it begins with the wrong utilitarian argument.
22 Nonetheless, does pointing out these more fundamental problems in liberal theory mean that one must reject "rights"?
Clearly, it would be easy to interpret MacKinnon's objections to liberal rights theory as a simple rejection of certain rights-like the right to privacy or the right to free speech-if not all rights in general. Dworkin seems to interpret MacKinnon in this way when, in his review of Only Words, he writes: "She [MacKinnon] and her followers regard freedom of speech and thought as an elitist, inegalitarian ideal that has been of almost no value to women, blacks, and others without power; they say America would be better off if it demoted that ideal as many other nations have" (Dworkin 1993, 42) . Elsewhere in this same article, Dworkin suggests that MacKinnon sees "equality" and "liberty" as opposed to one another, that she sees them as "competing constitutional value [s]" (1993, 36) . On the one hand, Dworkin might be right: MacKinnon seems to dismiss many of the rights that are currently discussed in liberal political debates. She offers numerous arguments about the way that these rights function to uphold the status quo, to obscure relations of power, and to prevent equality from being achieved. What I have suggested, however, is that this does not mean that she is rejecting "rights" per se, nor does it mean that one who endorses her criticisms of liberal rights theory must reject all use of rights. Although she writes harshly about rights, MacKinnon must be understood as criticizing the way that these rights have been formulated-and even the way that they currently function-outside of a critical analysis of society's structures of power and outside of questions of equality. It is only by asking these sorts of questions and by analyzing the social relations of power (in ways that go well beyond the simplistic individual/government dichotomy) that one could come up with a new conception of rights that would not suffer from the problems of liberalism.
The criticisms of liberal rights theory that I have culled from MacKinnon's work do point to the need for an alternative theory of rights. Although I have not explained what a new conception of rights might look like, I have suggested that it would specify concretely the needs and interests of groups of oppressed people. Because liberals define rights abstractly (and because they tend to focus on individual, negative rights), they often take for granted social relations of power. As a result, the rights of people of color, women, workingclass people, and other members of oppressed groups tend to be overlooked. The allegedly abstract way that liberal theory formulates and describes the rights to which individuals are said to be entitled often conceals the more concrete content that these rights have come to have in our society. In this way, the rights that upper-middle-class white men value and already enjoy are protected under the guise of treating individual preferences neutrally and protecting abstract rights. To change a system in which certain groups of people already have powers and freedoms that are-at least in practice-unavailable to others, an alternative theory of rights would have to include an analysis of who has power over whom, and it would have to concern itself with attempting to remedy these inequalities through changing society's institutions, practices, and structures of power.
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1. Feminists have identified a variety of problems with liberal rights theory and have come to somewhat different conclusions about the usefulness of rights theory for women. For instance, see Elizabeth Schneider (1986) ; Patricia Williams (1991, Ch. 8); Wendy Brown (1995, Ch. 5); Julie Peters and Andrea Wolper (1995) ; and Martha Minow and Mary Lyndon Shanley (1996) .
2. Hereafter, every reference I make to "Dworkin" that is not prefaced by a first initial should be understood as a reference to Ronald Dworkin (not Andrea Dworkin).
3. "Since the citizens of a society differ in their conceptions [of the good life, or of what gives value to life], the government does not treat them as equals if it prefers one conception to another. . . ." (Dworkin 1984a, 64) .
4. As Langton points out in her essay, "Whose Right? Ronald Dworkin, Women, and Pornographers," Dworkin is not even consistent in how he defines "external" preferences. She specifically highlights the way in which Dworkin extends dramatically the notion of an external preference in his discussion of the Sweatt case from the discussion of it at work in "What Rights Do We Have?" (Langton 1990, 322) .
5. See Dworkin (1985, 335-72, Ch. 17) . 6. In discussing the Sweatt decision, Dworkin explains that in any community in which there is a strong prejudice against a particular minority, "the personal preferences upon which a utilitarian argument must fix will be saturated with that prejudice" (Dworkin 1977, 237) , and this will make it difficult, if not impossible, to reliably determine whether these preferences are really "personal" or whether they are actually "external" preferences. Thus, in such cases, "no utilitarian argument purporting to justify a disadvantage to that minority can be fair." For such a disadvantage to be fair, one would have to prove that the same disadvantage would have been justified in the absence of the prejudice; in cases where "the prejudice is widespread and pervasive, as in fact it is in the case of blacks, that can never be shown" (1977, .
7. Specifically, Langton argues that, in the current context of women's inequality, it is at least "difficult to disentangle personal preferences about pornography . . . from external preferences, difficult to answer the hypothetical question about the dependence of the desire on the prejudice" (Langton 1990, 346) . Given this difficulty, according to Dworkin's own formulation of external preferences in his discussion of the Sweatt case, Langton argues that we must conclude that the preferences to view pornography are "external."
8. For an excellent account of this problem, and for further discussion of the specific problems that women of color face getting their claims of discrimination addressed, see Kimberle Crenshaw (1989) .
9. Helen Zia details a number of cases in which white men targeted Asian women for brutal acts of sexual violence. None of the cases that she describes was prosecuted as a racially-motivated hate crime, even though the victims were targeted specifically because they were Asians. Zia argues that the presence of gender as an element in the crimes was seen as somehow negating the possibility that the incidents were also racist.
10. MacKinnon details several examples of how pornography has been used to sexualize racial hatred and to turn racial stereotypes into sexual fetishes: "Asian women are presented so passive they cannot be said to be alive, bound so they are not recognizably human, hanging from trees and light fixtures and clothes hooks in closets. Black women are presented as animalistic bitches, bruised and bleeding, struggling against their bonds. Jewish women orgasm in reenactments of actual death camp tortures" (MacKinnon 1991, 797) . For additional examples and analysis of how pornog-raphy can work to reinforce racism as well as sexism, see Gloria Cowan (1994) , Tracey Gardner (1980), and Zia (1994) .
11. MacKinnon explains, "Rape law assumes that consent to sex is as real for women as it is for men. Privacy law assumes that women in private have the same privacy men do. Obscenity law assumes that women have the access to speech men have. Equality law assumes that women are already socially equal to men. Only to the extent women have already achieved social equality does the mainstream law of equality support their inequality claims" (1989, 169) . For a compelling example of how these formal legal rights can work against the interests of women, see MacKinnon's discussion of women in prostitution (1993b).
12. MacKinnon explains this in more detail in Only Words: " . . . censorship occurs less through explicit state policy than through official and unofficial privileging of powerful groups and viewpoints" (1993a, 77). One specific example that she discusses is the way in which publishing decisions are made by powerful individuals, who are both wealthy and privileged. She explains that "publishing decisions, no matter how one-sided and cumulative and exclusionary, are regarded as the way the system of freedom of expression is supposed to work. Legal accountability for these decisions is regarded as fascism; social accountability for them is regarded as creeping fascism; the decisions themselves are regarded as freedom of speech" (1993a, 77-78).
13. Interestingly, although MacKinnon faults liberal theorists for focusing on negative-and not positive-rights, in the end, it is not clear that MacKinnon really finds this distinction useful. More specifically, her work seems to call into question the idea that a person could have a "negative" right. How is it that someone could have a right that others (including the government) not interfere with him or herthe right simply to be "left alone"? Such a right does not make sense if one takes seriously MacKinnon's contention that individuals are always embedded in certain social structures and networks of power. Thus, when the government acts as if it is leaving a person "alone" to do as she or he pleases, it is really only surrendering its authority to other institutional arrangements of power. In other words, one is in a sense never really "left alone" because social and political institutions, in large part, always limit and shape an individual's activities and possibilities.
14. MacKinnon describes one way in which pornography harms women as women when she explains, "[p]ornography purports to define what a woman is. It does this on a group basis, including when it raises individual qualities to sexual stereotypes . . . " (1989, 209) . By defining "women" in this way, pornography encourages male sexual violence and contributes to an atmosphere in which women's consent is inferred from their silence.
15. Dworkin goes on to state this even more conclusively: "Sadistic pornography . . . is greatly overshadowed by these dismal cultural influences as a causal force" (1991, 106) . He also makes claims nearly identical to these in his review of MacKinnon's Only Words: " . . . the view[s] of women presented in soap operas and commercials . . . are much greater obstacles to that equality than the dirty films watched by a small minority" (1993, 36) .
16. See MacKinnon (1991, . 17. In suggesting that "equal concern and respect" be considered a "goal," I am not proposing that it be considered a goal instead of a right. I claim that there is a problem with the way that Dworkin draws the distinction between rights and goals as if they were mutually exclusive. I suggest that by viewing rights as goals (and not in opposition to them), one is faced with the need to strive to achieve the conditions in which all can exercise rights, conditions under which rights are possessed in more than a merely formal sense. Furthermore, I do not mean to suggest that the Constitution should not protect the goal of equality or that equality should be left up to the whims of whomever is currently in power. Although this would be the consequence of arguing that equality is a goal instead of a right, this is not my claim.
18. Unfortunately, there is not sufficient space here for me to undertake a more thorough explication of MacKinnon's particular conception of "equality," which differs significantly from Dworkin's. In contrast to the liberal emphasis on procedures for "neutral" treatment (which frequently amount to treating "likes" alike and treating those who are "different" differently), for MacKinnon "[t]he question of equality . . . is at root a question of hierarchy" (1987, 40) . For a more detailed description of her conception of equality-especially of sex equality-see MacKinnon (1989, 215-34, Ch. 12 ) entitled "Sex Equality: On Difference and Dominance."
19. For instance, MacKinnon discusses the importance of considering the "free speech" issues that are involved in campus anti-harassment policies in the context of questions of equality: " . . . the virtual absence of discussion of equality in recent litigation over discrimination policies that prohibit group-based harassment and bigotry on campuses was astounding. . . . In challenges to these regulations under the First Amendment, which have been successful so far, the statutory equality interest is barely mentioned" (1993a, 87).
20. MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin describe the way in which "civil rights" became defined in the Civil Rights Movement: "Our contemporary understanding of civil rights-what they are, what they mean-comes out of the Black experience . . . " (MacKinnon and Dworkin 1988, 11) . They explain that the civil rights that Blacks won were ultimately also secured for some other oppressed groups, but that this, too, occurred through political struggle: "This broadening of civil-rights protection to many stigmatized groups was the result of political activism, legislative initiatives, and many, many lawsuits" (1988, 11) .
21. My critique of Dworkin-that he does not consider rights to be "goals," that he considers rights and goals to be entirely separate-should not be understood as a claim that Dworkin actually advocates rights that really do not involve any "goals" at all. On the contrary; I am not suggesting that liberal rights are too abstract and that they need to be made more concrete by tying them to actual goals. I am claiming that liberal rights already do advocate a particular "goal" without claiming to be advocating anything in particular. The "goal" that they advocate implicitly, at least according to MacKinnon, is the maintenance of the current hierarchies of social power.
22. Note that Langton does not commit herself to a position about what exact conclusion is to be drawn from the fact that Dworkin's liberal theory can be made to yield non-liberal conclusions.
